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The pharmaceutical industry is at a crossro-
ads. In 2010, it faces one of the biggest waves
of proprietary patent expirations yet lacks a
viable pipeline to replace these soon to be
generics. Furthermore, R&D expenditures have
more than doubled from 1995 to 2006 without
commensurate increase in NMEs (new mole-
cular entities, Martinez and Goldstein, 2007).
In 2007, the FDA(Food and Drug Administra-
tion) only approved 19 novel drugs, the lowest
number since 1983(Blum, 2008).
At this critical juncture, pharma would bene-
fit immensely from a dose of “new thinking”
and “expert insight” on ways to reinvigorate
its innovation model within R&D. The authors
assert that there is much to learn from the pro-
blems and successes of non-pharma peers,who
at one point faced a similar crisis, that of
incremental innovation and falling new pro-
duct introductions. Their stories offer the phar-
maceutical industry an invaluable perspecti-
ve that will shed light on pharma’s own case
for re-thinking its approach to drug discovery
and development.
What follows are eight mini-cases, each one
representing a distinct non-life science indus-
try corporation, and the programs they initia-
ted to reinvigorate their product development
efforts:
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Motorola
Change Implemented: Appointed, empowe-
red, andmade amanager accountable for each
product development program.
“Although world-renowned as a leader in qua-
lity control, Motorola insiders believed strin-
gent processes, although critical to maintai-
ning quality and monitoring costs, stifled the
company’s innovation process.”
Motorola’s turnaround, from producer of unap-
pealing mobile phones to the creator of the
“iconic” RAZR phone was facilitated by dras-
tic change in product development decision
making.
The pioneer of mobile phones that once domi-
nated the communications industry fell upon
difficult times when competitors such as Nokia,
Samsung and LG entered the market offering
products with greater consumer appeal. Alt-
hough world-renowned as a leader in quality
control, Motorola insiders believed stringent
processes, although critical to maintaining
quality and monitoring costs, stifled the com-
pany’s innovation process. The main culprit:
Motorola’s consensus based decision-making
process utilized to develop a new phone; a pro-
cess in which representatives from eachmajor
region were required to establish a position
on a new product concept. “The regions would
request the sorts of features and functions
they wanted included in the design. Each regi-
on would then forecast howmany units of the
model they thought they could sell. The aggre-
gated regional plans would helpMotorola deci-
de whether to invest in a phone’s introducti-
on”(Anthony, 2005). Although it provided con-
sensus amongst all the regions, it was time-
consuming, cumbersome, and ultimately pro-
duced products that lacked any consumer
appeal.
Incoming CEO, Ed Zander (2004), dramatical-
ly altered this decision-making process by
transforming the organizational structure of
new product development teams by empowe-
ring decision making to its managers. The
results were simplified decision making, fas-
ter project cycle turn-around times, and acce-
lerated go/no-go project decision making
(Shinn, 2007).
The culmination of these efforts was birthed
in the RAZR phone, “iconic” and “hip”, shatte-
ring Motorola’s stodgy product image. At its
introduction, the RAZR was the world’s slim-
mest phone with enhanced features such as
a camera and internet capabilities. Over one
million units were sold during its first six
months on the market (Anthony, 2005).
McDonald’s
Change Implemented: Refocused on the cus-
tomer experience
“…change occurred only after [McDonald’s]
returned to its roots of providing the best expe-
rience for its customers.”
McDonald’s reclaimed the title of the world’s
largest fast food restaurant chain after it retur-
ned to its roots, to provide the best possible
experience for its customers.
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Same-store sales experienced a sharp decline
in early 2003, resulting from failure to fulfill
important McDonald’s processes, such as “full-
field” evaluation standards (Tilson, 2003). The
failure to ensure cleanliness, quality and con-
sistency, resulted in a negative “McDonald’s”
customer experience. Furthermore, McDo-
nald’s ignored the market’s shifting tastes
toward a greater emphasis on “healthier” fast
food selections. At the end of first quarter
2003, McDonald’s announced its first-ever
quarterly loss (Horovitz, 2004).
Newly appointed CEO, Jim Cantalupo, initia-
ted “Plan to Win” (BusinessWeek, 2007). The
program scaled back opening of new restau-
rants, required better service from its employe-
es, and introduced new and healthier menu
items (Gibson and Grey, 2004). McDonald’s
also slashed capital spending by 40% while
addressing mounting customer complaints by
speeding up drive-thru service and ensuring
surly employees were disciplined (Gibson and
Grey, 2004). Food studios were developed in
the different regions served by McDonald’s to
create products that focused onmeeting regio-
nal-specific consumer demands.
Eleven months after Cantalupo took charge,
“Plan to Win” brought customers back into
McDonald’s restaurants and delivered impres-
sive results: 2003 net income rose to $1.471 bil-
lion from $893.5 million (Gibson and Grey,
2004); system-wide sales increased 11.1% in
September of the same year; and same store
sales increased by 10% (Tilson, 2003).
Apple
Change Implemented: Eliminated “silo men-
tality” within R&D. Consolidate all R&D functi-
ons into one product development group
accountable to one manager. Better unders-
tood and focused on customer experience.
“Jobs reorganized R&D into product groups
that included in them all the functional areas
needed to deliver on the consumer’s product
experience. They were accountable to one
manager.”
Apple’s reemergence as the global innovator
of computer products occurred once its origi-
nal founder, Steve Jobs, returned as CEO.
Prior to his return, Apple suffered from senior
management missteps that included inves-
ting heavily on ill-fated projects and repeated
large-scale funding on dead-end projects. Pro-
fits began to erode and by 1995 Apple’s once
9% market share declined to 7.4% and it suf-
fered a $69 million loss in the fourth quarter
of 1994 (Hormby, 2006).
Jobs returned to Apple in 1997 and instituted
drastic change. He made significant cuts in
Apple’s product portfolio, discontinued pro-
ducts that were underperforming (Linzmayer
and Chaffin, 2005) and opted for a streamli-
ned product offering of products he believed
to be highly innovative. Jobs also restructu-
red his product development organization,
which, until his return,was divided into highly-
siloed functional groups that did not work
cohesively. He dismantled these disparate
functional groups and integrated them into
separate product (iPod, iMac, etc.) development
groups which all reported to one manager.
Designers, hardware and software engineers,
and manufacturers, all worked to seamlessly
integrate every aspect of a product’s functio-
nality that captivated the complete user expe-
rience (Grossmann, 2005). The reorganization
has produced groundbreaking products such
as the iPod, iPhone, and iMac.
Although the company launches fewer new
products today and only spends 4% of revenue
on R&D (Wolverton, 2006), its revenues in fis-
cal year 2007 stood at $24 billion, a 348% increa-
se since fiscal year end 2001, the year the iPod
was launched. Apple ended fiscal year 2007
with $15 billion in cash and zero debt (Apple
Inc., 2007). As of January 2007 the iPod garne-
red 73% market share of mp3 players sold glo-
bally (Wikipedia, 2008).
Walt Disney
Change Implemented: Nurtured and levera-
ged corporate synergies while preserving cor-
porate values
“[Michael Eisner] managed the ambitious tur-
naround by leveraging Disney’s brand and nur-
tured creativity by accessing previously untap-
ped corporate synergies.”
Following serious declines in profits after the
death of its creator, Walt Disney in 1966, CEO
Michael Eisner transformed Walt Disney Inc.
into the world’s largest entertainment empire
(Weber, 1998).
As the chief source of creative efforts within
Walt Disney Inc., the death of Mr. Disney took
a significant toll on the quality and depth of
the company’s product pipeline. When Eisner
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assumed the role of CEO in 1984, Disney’s box
office shares were a paltry 4%, the lowest
amongst all major studios (Walt Disney Inc.,
1984).
Eisner steered the ambitious turnaround by
leveraging Disney’s brand and nurtured crea-
tivity by accessing previously untapped cor-
porate synergies. His turnaround revolved
around building Disney’s brand while preser-
ving the corporate values of “quality, creativi-
ty, entrepreneurship, and teamwork” (Ruks-
tad and Collins , 2005). To achieve this, Eisner
centralized many corporate functions, such as
corporate marketing, engendering important
synergies within Disney. Corporate wide stra-
tegic planning events were jointly coordina-
ted by senior management, bringing depart-
ments together to generate novel ideas. The
results from these ideation exercises were then
coordinated by a corporate events department,
designed specifically to disseminate “Disney
synergies” enabling each strategic business
unit to benefit from each other and bolster
lagging units. Eisner cultivated creativity using
Disney’s most vital corporate skill, “managing
creativity”. He fostered expansive and inno-
vative ideas by readily approving spending in
concept-generation, while expecting business
units to deliver against well-defined strategic
and financial objectives, pitting creative and
financial forces against each other as each
business developed its market position. With
corporate synergies and creative management
processes in place, Eisner was able to ramp up
movie production from two per year in 1984
to 15 to 18 per year four years later. During this
period animation movie production was also
expanded to a new animated feature every 12
to 18 months instead of one every two years
(Rukstad and Collins , 2005).
Eisner’s turnaround efforts raised revenue from
$1.65 billion in 1984 to $25 billion by 2000 and
net earnings rose from $0.1 billion to $1.2 bil-
lion during his first 15 years, generating a 27%
annual total return to shareholders during this
period (La Franco, 1999). He exceeded his ori-
ginal promise of generating at least 20% annu-
al shareholder returns and also managed one
of the greatest corporate turnarounds in his-
tory.
Procter & Gamble
Change Implemented: Sourced innovation
wherever it can be accessed; internally and
externally
“New leadership immediately recognized the
need to restructure their R&D organization
and the “Connect and Develop” innovation
model was established.”
Procter & Gamble reinvigorated new product
development and engendered growth by trans-
forming their R&D organization and imple-
menting a novel innovation strategy in “Con-
nect & Develop”.
P&G traditionally based much of its success
on new product innovation and its deep under-
standing of consumer needs through its pio-
neering market research activities which stu-
died consumer preferences and buying habits
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(Procter & Gamble, 2007). By 2000, the com-
pany was facing a crisis, their internally focu-
sed innovation model was producing flat pro-
duct success rates of 35%, resulting in a pipe-
line too weak to sustain its expected 4% annu-
al growth rate (Huston and Sakkab, 2006).
P&G saw their sales growth rate flatten over
a four year span beginning in 1999 and their
stock price dropped bymore than 50% in 2000
alone (Huston and Sakkab, 2006).
Facing this situation, newly appointed CEO
A.G. Lafley and CTO G. Gil Cloyd, placed P&G
under new direction called “Job One”, to return
P&G to historical dominance in product deve-
lopment and improve sales growth rates above
the industry average (Colvin, 2006). The new
leadership immediately recognized the need
to restructure their R&D organization and the
“Connect and Develop” innovation model was
established. The “Connect and Develop”model
enabled P&G to becomemore connected inter-
nally by enabling technologies and ideas to
move more easily across existing business
units, more unique and invaluable was P&G’s
new found ability to gain an intimate under-
standing of consumer needs and access to
innovators outside the company through a
much larger network of both proprietary and
non-proprietary relationships.
The model effectively increased P&G’s R&D
staff from 7,500 internal members to include
an estimated 1.5 million external staff mem-
bers. As a result, R&D productivity has since
risen 60% and over 35% of all new products
commercialized have been developed exter-
nally. Internal innovation success rates have
doubled, total sales has grown 90% from 2002
to 2007, and their stock price has doubled since
2000 (Huston and Sakkab, 2006).
3M
Change Implemented: Applied discipline, focus,
and accountability to the innovation process
“The focus was not to just survive in existing
product niches but to continue to innovate and
develop new ideas.”
3M transformed their product development
organization by instituting Six Sigma discipli-
ne to overcome slower new product introducti-
ons and sales growth.
3M corporate image has long been built on
innovative and unique products, constantly
seeking to fill unmet product niches by devo-
ting up to 25% of sales to new product deve-
lopment (3M, 2002). This intense focus on inno-
vation enabled 3M to create such groundbrea-
king products as Scotch® tape and Post-It®
notes which contributed to the company’s heal-
thy topline growth.
In the late 1990s, 3M’s stock price began to sta-
gnate as competition grew in its traditional
product niches and number of new product
introductions slowed (BusinessWeek, 2004;
Funding Universe, 2007). Although 35% of reve-
nues generated in 2000were attributed to pro-
ducts introduced within the past four years,
3M had not produced a blockbuster product
since the introduction of the Post-It® note in
© 2008 Institute of Business Administration
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1980. By the late 1990s both revenues and pro-
fits were declining as a result of fierce com-
petition from lower priced substitutes (Fun-
ding Universe, 2007).
New CEO, Jim McNerney, arrived in 2001, and
as his first order of business, instituted Six
Sigma practices to cut costs and streamline
product development efforts resulting in lay-
offs of over 6% of the workforce (Funding Uni-
verse, 2007). Utilizing Six Sigma, McNerney
sought to bring discipline and focus to the
R&D organization - the focus was not to be
more competitive in existing product niches
but to continue to innovate and develop new
ideas by transforming 3M into a nimbler and
leaner innovative corporation (Arndt and Brady,
2004). R&D was consolidated by closing four-
teen technology centers, transferring staff to
a newly formed Corporate Research Laborato-
ry or to the company’s 40 divisions and funds
were channeled programs that exhibited a hig-
her probability of potential success instead of
access to equal funding across-the-board (Fun-
ding Universe, 2007). Furthermore, researchers
were pushed to work more closely with mar-
keting to transform existing in-house techno-
logies into commercial products in order to
stay ahead of their competitors (Arndt and
Brady, 2004).
The R&D reorganization efforts delivered pro-
fit growth of 22% per year while McNerney
was CEO and increased operatingmargins from
17% in 2001 to 23% in 2005 (Arndt and Brady,
2004).
Cadillac
Change Implemented: Embraced risk and tole-
rance for failure as a key requirement for inno-
vation process to succeed
“The success of “art and science” can not be
measured in sales, which have been slow to
respond, but by the reinvigorated reputation
and brand image.”
Cadillac’s willingness to take an “all or not-
hing” attitude towards the complete overhaul
and redesign of its fleet enabled the compa-
ny to reestablish its reputation and brand as
the icon of American automobile industry.
Soon after World War II, Cadillac was viewed
as the classic American automobile – superior
and innovative engineering coupled with dis-
tinctive style and high performance (Lamm,
2002). The early 1980s saw the backlash
towards Cadillac reach its peak as rising fuel
costs and demands on better fuel economy
hurt Cadillac’s sales (Welch and Khermouch,
2002). In response to changing consumer
demands, Cadillac decided to downsize vehi-
cles and utilize platform cross-sharing with
other GM brands, resulting in loss of build qua-
lity, brand identity, and lower sales. Although
these quality issues were resolved long ago,
the damage done to its brand image was enor-
mous.
In the late 1990s, senior management at Gene-
ral Motors, owner of the Cadillac brand, beca-
me serious about saving the fallen icon (Welch
and Khermouch, 2002). Senior GM executives
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were presented with two routes: The safe opti-
on, a redesign of the fleet following Europe-
an modalities. And the risky route, a radical
redesign of its fleet that evoked memories of
the classic distinctiveness that was represen-
tative of the ostentatious Cadillac style. To save
the icon, Cadillac took the high-risk route and
developed “art and science”, the blueprint
which introduced innovative design comple-
mented by smart, targeted marketing. Cadil-
lac introduced the 2003 CTS, the first Cadillac
model to embody “art and science”, sharp and
distinct lines which established it in a class of
its own in the luxury sedan category.
The success of “art and science” can not be
measured in sales alone,which have been slow
to respond, but by the reinvigorated reputati-
on and brand image: The average Cadillac buy-
er’s age has dropped from 64 in 2000 to 57 in
2005. The 2008 CTS recently wonMotor Trend’s
2008 Car of the Year award (Antoine, 2007).
The Cadillac Escalade SUV is an icon amongst
rap stars, young urbanites and professional
athletes, the antithesis of Cadillac buyers until
its introduction (McCarthy, 2005).
IBM
Change Implemented: Eliminated “silo men-
tality” within R&D. Sourced innovation whe-
rever it can be accessed; internally and exter-
nally.
“Lou Gerstner sought to save the company by
implementing a cultural change at IBM from
one that was individual-centric to a team-cen-
tric approach to product development.”
IBM transformed its R&D organization and
instituted a company-wide cultural change
upon recognition of their dated R&D structu-
re and self-limiting culture.
By 1993, IBM was considered the largest com-
puting company in the world, but was simul-
taneously reporting a net loss of $8.1 billion,
the third straight year in which losses were
reported (Kannelos and Spooner, 2002;
Knowledge at Wharton, 2007). Their “ingrown”
company culture was proving to be an obsta-
cle to innovation as research was kept highly
secretive and siloed and working with exter-
nal vendors was shunned (DiCarlo, 2002).
In 1993, incoming CEO Lou Gerstner sought to
save the company by implementing a cultu-
ral change at IBM from one that was indivi-
dual centered to one that encouraged a “team
centered” approach to product development
(Knowledge at Wharton, 2007). Internally, the
company changed its focus from stand-alone
product development initiatives to product
development offerings focused on bundled
products that provide business problem solu-
tions (DiCarlo, 2002). Furthermore, compensa-
tion incentives were instituted to reward team
efforts rather than focus solely on individual
accomplishments; and overall compensation
was directly linked to company performance
as opposed to divisional achievements.
The corporate culture transformation has enab-
led IBM to consistently file the most number
of patents every year. In 2001, IBM earned $8
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billion in profits from $85.9 billion in sales,
marking the eighth straight year of profit
growth since Gerstner took office (Routson,
2002).
Conclusion
The mini-cases highlight eight programs that
successfully implemented new processes to
significantly transform the product develop-
ment efforts of the featured companies. The
programs delivered increased R&D producti-
vity, higher product success rates, portfolio of
innovative products and services, which in
some cases established or redefined their
respective industries, and higher sales and pro-
fit results.
Two common themes emerged from the mini-
cases:
Existing leadership or new leadership iden-
tified the urgency to implement change in
all eight companies
All transformation programs centered
around the R&D organization
The eight mini-cases surfaced ten key changes
that defined the success of programs imple-
mented:
Appoint, empower, and make accountable,
a manager to oversee each product deve-
lopment program
Strengthen product/service focus on cus-
tomer/customer experience
Streamline product portfolio; discard under-
performing products and focus on innova-
tive products with a high probability of suc-
cess
Eliminate “silo mentality” within R&D.
Consolidate all R&D functions into one pro-
duct development group accountable to one
manager
Nurture and leverage corporate synergies
while preserving corporate values
Communicate “change plan”, assign a
name/catch phrase that embodies its
objective
Source innovation wherever it can be acces-
sed; internally and externally
Apply discipline, focus, and accountability
to the innovation process
Embrace risk and tolerance for failure as
key requirements for innovation process to
succeed
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